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A GLIMPSE INSIDE THE BRAIN’S BLACK BOX:  
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE 
OF NEUROSCIENCE IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
Bernice B. Donald* & Erica Bakies** 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not a secret:  size matters.  And where it matters most is within the 
most complex structure in the universe—the brain, a mass of gray and white 
matter that controls an extraordinary number of functions and processes that 
allow us to walk, talk, breathe, reason, feel emotions, and perceive and 
experience the world around us.  While we have made great strides in 
studying this three-pound ball of cells, it still mostly remains a mystery 
beyond our grasp of comprehension.  But what little we do know has led to 
great developments in the legal community and especially in the criminal 
justice system.  This Article focuses on the utilization of neuroscience and 
its developing technology in the courtroom, particularly at the sentencing 
phase of trial. 
While the brain encompasses a wide variety of fields of study, 
neuroscience offers specific and tangible insight into brain 
underdevelopment and brain injuries.  For example, neuroscience 
demonstrates that what our childhood was like—whether good, bad, or in 
between—greatly impacts the full development of this vital organ.  Studies 
show that exposure to stress and instability actually prevents the brain from 
fully developing.  In other words, the brain remains small and those 
processes it controls immature.  Children exposed to trauma face a number 
of disorders, including “depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), conduct disorder, anxiety 
disorders, eating disorders, sleep disorders, communication disorders, 
separation anxiety disorder, and/or reactive attachment disorder,” to name a 
few.1 
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Collide held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see 
Deborah W. Denno, Foreword:  Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and 
Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016). 
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Because the effects of childhood trauma stem from one’s surroundings, 
children who live in inner cities that are plagued with violence and racial 
tension often experience childhood trauma and the diagnoses that follow it.2  
Notably, the same types of experiences are present in children who are 
exposed to the welfare system.3  While most people are familiar with 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), children who are constantly exposed 
to trauma and dangerous situations, like those in dangerous inner-city 
neighborhoods, face a far more compounded scenario:  complex trauma.4  
Complex trauma is “the dual problem of children’s exposure to multiple 
traumatic events and the impact of this exposure on immediate and long-
term outcomes.”5  Those outcomes include “psychiatric and addictive 
disorders, chronic medical illness, and legal, vocational, and family 
problems.”6  In short, neuroscience can identify both childhood trauma and 
its lasting impression on an individual as they become an adult. 
Now that current neuroscience technology has the ability to demonstrate 
how exposure to childhood trauma affects an individual’s brain, the next 
question is how this science and its conclusions in the courtroom can be 
effectively utilized.  This question becomes very apparent in the context of 
sentencing, where a judge may consider a wide range of factors in 
determining an appropriate sentence for those defendants standing before 
her.  Without disregarding the criminal justice system’s ability to hold those 
accountable for their actions, neuroscience can be utilized to demonstrate 
that certain actions may actually be the result of developmental problems 
associated with the brain, like the effects of complex trauma on children.  A 
judge may also use neuroscience to combat her implicit biases, which have 
ways of manifesting themselves in the courtroom and therefore need to be 
explicitly acknowledged.  Neuroscience can offer additional insight into a 
defendant’s thought process and accordingly provide a means for the judge 
to address and correct those biases. 
This Article begins by discussing what neuroscience and the smaller 
associated field of study, neuropsychology, are and what they can tell us 
about an individual.  It then recounts a brief history of sentencing in the 
United States.  Additionally, it expounds on how the legal system currently 
utilizes neuroscience in the courts, noting specifically the ways in which 
neuroscience can be presented during the sentencing phase of trial.  Finally, 
it discusses the use of neuroscience as a mitigating factor during sentencing 
and how judges can use neuroscience to combat their implicit biases. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In conjunction with the National Institute of Health, President Barack 
Obama launched the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative 
 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative, which focuses on revolutionizing 
our understanding of the human brain.7  The goal is to fill major gaps in our 
current knowledge and provide unprecedented opportunities for exploring 
exactly how the brain enables the human body to record, process, utilize, 
store, and retrieve vast quantities of information, all at the speed of 
thought.8  Recent developments concerning the brain have been historic and 
far reaching. 
A.  The Science 
Unsurprisingly, this expansion in funding and focus has contributed to 
the many fields of study concerning the brain.  Relevant here, 
neuroscientists are not only concerned with the normal functioning of the 
brain in conjunction with the rest of the nervous system but also with the 
effects of neurological, psychiatric, and developmental disorders on 
people’s actions.9  Neuroscience is a branch of the life sciences that 
addresses the anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, or molecular biology of 
nerves and nervous tissue within the brain, specifically in relation to 
behavior and learning.10  More generally, neuroscience is the study of how 
processes function within the brain. 
Another key area of study that increases our understanding of the 
complexity of the brain and its effects on behavior is neuropsychology.  
Neuropsychology adds to the picture outlined by neuroscience, as it is 
concerned with the integration of psychological observations of behavior 
and the mind with neurological observations of the brain and nervous 
system.11  This is because “[s]tandard neuroimaging is neither specific nor 
sensitive enough to detect the damage done to the brain.”12  Basically, 
 
 7. THE BRAIN INITIATIVE, http://braininitiative.nih.gov/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/T3TS-UMQM]. 
 8. Id. (explaining that by “accelerating the development and application of innovative 
technologies, researchers will be able to produce a revolutionary new dynamic picture of the 
brain that . . . shows how individual [brain] cells and complex neural circuits interact . . . at 
the speed of thought”). 
 9. Christian Nordqvist, What Is Neuroscience?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/248680.php [https://perma.cc/7AQ7-NJTB]. 
 10. See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword:  An Empirical Study 
of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 500 (2015) (defining 
neuroscience as “the branch of life sciences that studies the brain and nervous systems 
[including] . . . brain processes such as sensation, perception, learning, memory, and 
movement” (alterations in original) (quoting BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE 
LAW:  BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE, 206 (2004))); see also Neuroscience, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
neuroscience (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/N7LG-5JK7]. 
 11. Neuropsychology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/neuropsychology (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
4TFQ-BWTC]. 
 12. Bruce H. Stern, Neuropsychology & Traumatic Brain Injury, TRIAL, Oct. 2015, at 
48, 49 (“Advanced neuroimaging, such as a PET scan or diffusion tensor imaging, provides 
evidence about how the brain is functioning . . . .”). 
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neuropsychology objectively analyzes how the mind works in connection 
with the brain.13 
Neuroscience and neuropsychology typically involve comprehensive and 
extensive evaluations.  These evaluations have been incorporated into the 
legal field most notably as “neuroscience evidence.”14  Two of the most 
common categories of these tests are (1) neuroimaging, or “‘imaging tests,’ 
which are generated by computer images of a human brain,” and (2) 
neuropsychological exams, or “‘non-imaging tests,’ which are based on 
tests administered by a medical professional to an individual for the purpose 
of gaining insight into how that person’s brain operates.”15 
Neuroimaging now allows neurologists to analyze the structural and 
functional aspects of the brain.16  Structural neuroimaging involves 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and computed tomography (CT) 
scans.17  These images demonstrate “the brain’s architecture.”18  Similarly, 
scans such as the electroencephalography (EEG), positron emission 
tomography (PET) scans, and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) display visual images of how the brain works at a particular 
moment in time.19 
Neuropsychological exams are more than just scans of the brain.  A 
neuropsychological evaluation is a “comprehensive, objective assessment 
of a wide range of cognitive, adaptive, and emotional behaviors that reflect 
the adequacy or inadequacy of higher brain functions.”20  In other words, 
neuropsychological testing measures a person’s brain function compared to 
the normal population in a variety of different areas, including education, 
standardized test scores, and work history.21  This variety of tests—also 
known as a “battery”—requires access to the subject’s school records, 
medical records, and employment records.22  Other relevant background 
information may include the subject’s social and family history.23  
Considering all of these factors, a neuropsychologist can then determine a 
baseline of brain function for a particular individual, generally before a 
particular event occurs, such as the committing of a crime.24  For example, 
after conducting these tests, neuropsychologists are able to better 
understand and interpret the consequences of childhood neglect and its 
 
 13. See id. 
 14. Denno, supra note 10, at 500. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Sydney B. Roth, Comment, The Emergence of Neuroscience Evidence in 
Louisiana, 87 TUL. L. REV. 197, 202 (2012). 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. (quoting Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1775 
(2004)). 
 19. See Roth, supra note 16, at 203. 
 20. Stern, supra note 12, at 49. 
 21. See id. at 49–50. 
 22. See id. at 49. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
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effects on brain development, particularly when it comes to explaining how 
those individuals ended up in the criminal justice system.25 
Because “human behavior is the very currency in which law”—and 
especially criminal law—deals, there is an unending need for an improved 
understanding of how and why particular people behave the way that they 
do.26  Dubbed “neurolaw,” this “neuroscience revolution” has gained the 
attention of legal thinkers and is poised to be the catalyst for significant 
changes in not only the criminal justice system but the legal field 
generally.27 
The development of neuroscience includes recent momentous 
breakthroughs, especially in how certain types of experiences during 
childhood can drastically affect the rest of a child’s life.28  In utero and 
during the first four years of life, a child’s rapidly developing brain 
organizes to reflect the child’s environment.29  By the age of four, a child’s 
brain is 90 percent of its adult size.30  Accordingly, a child who is exposed 
to trauma early on in her life organizes her brain around instability and 
chaos, which is extremely debilitating.31  For example, receiving “proper 
nutrition and stimulation during the first three years of life” is critical “for 
the brain to develop the crucial neurological networks that are foundational 
to the functioning of an individual.”32  Because of neuroscience, we now 
know that having these types of experiences at an early age can lead to 
“permanent and irreversible consequences,” especially in the “physical, 
cognitive, emotional, and social domains.”33  It bears noting that these 
consequences can weigh heavily not only on the child exposed to such 
circumstances but also on society itself, a weight that often goes 
unrecognized.34 
One of the most interesting aspects of neuroscience is that it can show us 
actual physical changes in response to childhood trauma.35  Studies 
demonstrate that there are differences in the volume of an adult’s prefrontal 
 
 25. Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, Before It’s Too Late:  Neuropsychological 
Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for Law and Social Policy, 
33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 562 (2000). 
 26. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 405, 407 (2005). 
 27. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort 
Law:  How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 235, 236 (2012). 
 28. See Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 25, at 562 (“Recent developments in the 
neurosciences have led to dramatic breakthroughs in the area of brain development and 
[especially] the understanding of consequences of [childhood] neglect.”). 
 29. See Bruce D. Perry, Maltreatment and the Developing Child:  How Early Childhood 
Experience Shapes Child and Culture, MARGARET MCCAIN LECTURE SERIES 2 (Sept. 23, 
2004), http://www.lfcc.on.ca/mccain/perry.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA8T-EYJG]. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 25, at 561. 
 33. Id. at 595. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1313 (2007). 
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cortex depending on whether that individual experienced trauma as child or 
whether they had a nurturing childhood.36  Studies also indicate that 
maltreated children exhibited “higher rates of adult psychopathology and a 
greater likelihood of engaging in maladaptive and socially disruptive 
courses of conduct as adults (such as engaging in substance abuse or 
violating criminal law).”37  These findings are significant in establishing the 
connection between childhood trauma and future offenses because the 
prefrontal cortex is involved in a vast number of functions, such as 
“executive functionality (for example, planning and controlling behavioral 
responses, problem-solving, and sustaining mental productivity), attention 
focusing, working and delayed memory, emotional regulation, and 
responses to stress.”38 
A newer development in the cross section of childhood trauma, 
neuropsychology, and neuroscience is analysis of “complex trauma” and its 
long-term effects on children.  When a child is exposed to any threat, her 
brain will activate a set of adaptive responses designed to help her 
survive.39  “Complex trauma” occurs when a child has been exposed to 
multiple traumatic events throughout her early life.40  When a child 
experiences repetitive activation of the stress response systems, her baseline 
state of arousal is altered.41  Thus, even when there is no external threat or 
demand, she is in a psychological state of alarm, commonly known as 
“fight or flight.”42  Although PTSD is similar to the fight-or-flight state of 
mind that exists with complex trauma, it does not capture the full range of 
developmental difficulties that traumatized children experience as a result 
of exposure to repeated traumatic incidents.43  For instance, when a stressor 
arises, which could be as simple as an argument with a peer or a demanding 
school task, a traumatized child’s emotions may rapidly escalate to a state 
of fear.44 
Further, when in a state of calm, a person can use the higher, more 
complex parts of the brain to process and act on information; in contrast, in 
a state of fear, a person is only able to access the lower, more primitive 
parts of the brain.45  An increase in threat level corresponds to “less 
thoughtful and . . . more reactive” responses.46  Further, “[a]ctions in this 
state may be governed by emotional and reactive thinking styles.”47  
Because a traumatized child’s baseline state of arousal is constantly altered, 
 
 36. See Lois A. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, Children’s Relationships with 
Primary Caregivers and Child Protection Policy Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1527 
(2012). 
 37. Id. at 1508–09. 
 38. Id. at 1526. 
 39. See Perry, supra note 29, at 2. 
 40. Cook et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id., at 1. 
 44. Perry, supra note 29, at 2. 
 45. See id. at 3. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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she is unable to learn from normal “social, emotional, and other life 
experiences.”48 
Complex trauma generally manifests itself in children who experience 
abuse or neglect, but it can also appear in children who have witnessed 
domestic violence, ethnic cleansing, or war.49  The consequences of 
complex trauma on a child are devastating for both her and her future.  That 
child can experience, among other things, trouble with “accurate 
identification of internal emotional experiences” and interference “with the 
formation of a secure attachment bond between a child and her caregiver,” 
which influences the child’s future relationships and social skills.50  The 
child can carry all of these problems forward to adulthood, where she must 
deal with them as a functional and participating member of society. 
Children who have complex trauma or who have survived extreme 
neglect are among the “hundreds of millions of people around the world 
living with mental disorders.”51  The World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
Mental Health Action Plan 2013–2020 emphasizes that, depending on the 
local context, certain portions of the population are more susceptible to 
mental health issues than others.52  Members of households living in 
poverty and infants or children exposed to maltreatment and neglect are 
included in those vulnerable categories.53  The WHO contextualizes these 
matters as more than public health issues; it characterizes them as 
developmental issues.54  If these issues are not directly addressed, children 
will continue to suffer from developmental impairments, perhaps by 
committing crimes or by being unable to positively contribute to society.55  
The number of those suffering continues to increase, and if they are 
prevented from becoming productive members of society, the global 
economy will suffer as well.56 
  
 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 2; see also Cook et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
 50. Cook et al., supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 51. Making Mental Health a Global Development Priority, MHGAP NEWSL. 1 (May 
2016) [hereinafter MHGAP NEWSLETTER], http://www.who.int/mental_health/mhgap/ 
newsletter_may_2016.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/W86G-ECP7]. 
 52. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MENTAL HEALTH ACTION PLAN 2013–2020, at 7 (2013), 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/action_plan_2013/bw_version.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7 
Y6-MSHR]. 
 53. See id. 
 54. MHGAP NEWSLETTER, supra note 51; see also Out of the Shadows:  Making Mental 
Health a Global Priority, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/ 
2016/03/09/out-of-the-shadows-making-mental-health-a-global-priority#1 (last visited Oct. 
16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/426B-ASXX]. 
 55. MHGAP NEWSLETTER, supra note 51. 
 56. See id. (noting that the World Bank, which is composed of ministers of finance and 
development agencies, decided to join the WHO in its efforts to move mental health into the 
mainstream developmental agenda). 
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B.  Sentencing in the United States 
Imprisonment in the United States and elsewhere was uncommon prior to 
the eighteenth century and was not used as a primary form of punishment 
until around the American Revolution.57  Punishment prior to prisons often 
focused on retaliation and vengeance.58  The Quakers, as pacifists, were 
against capital punishment and, accordingly, crusaded for reform by 
suggesting replacing traditional punishment with confinement and labor in 
prisons.59  This stance abruptly changed during the mid-twentieth century, 
and instead of confinement and labor, punishment focused on 
rehabilitation.60  About thirty to forty years ago, sentencing was again 
reformed.61  Pivoting from a focus on rehabilitation during the 1970s and 
1980s, public policy instead began applying severe penalties associated 
with the penological goals of deterrence and incapacitation.62 
The pivot in the 1970s and 1980s corresponded with an increase in street 
drugs, such as crack cocaine.63  It was this rise in drug use that led to the 
marked “War on Drugs.”64  The War on Drugs drastically increased the 
incarceration rate in numerous ways: 
(1) the direct incarceration of drug offenders, (2) the re-incarceration of 
all types of offenders due to drug-related parole violations, (3) the impact 
of drug incarcerations on prison admissions instead of prison populations, 
(4) the extent to which prior drug offenses trigger repeat-offender 
enhancement, even for non-drug crimes, and (5) the effects of large-scale 
drug arrests and incarcerations on neighborhood social cohesion, and the 
connections between social stability and incarceration.65 
In all, drug convictions increased tenfold between 1980 and 1996.66 
The War on Drugs also had an unintended but formidable effect on 
individuals with mental health issues who were susceptible to coming into 
 
 57. See Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. 
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 36–37 (1922). 
 58. See George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1238–39 
(1995) (discussing the English “Bloody Code” in which most felonies were capital crimes). 
 59. See Matthew W. Meskell, Note, The American Resolution:  The History of Prisons 
in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 839, 846–49 (1999) (explaining the 
early American prison reform in Pennsylvania and New York). 
 60. See id. at 849. 
 61. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:  A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
9–10 (2003). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1884 (1999). But 
see Doris Marie Provine, Race and Inequality in the War on Drugs, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 41, 4849 (2011) (“The war on drugs is thus distinctive from, though not incompatible 
with, the hardening of attitudes toward crime and punishment that began to take form in the 
1970s.”). 
 64. See Butler, supra note 63, at 48–49. 
 65. John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth:  Limited Importance, Limited 
Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 175 (2015). 
 66. Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 230 (2015). 
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contact with the criminal justice system.67  Prior to the War on Drugs, the 
United States began deinstitutionalizing psychiatric facilities with the hope 
of returning those individuals to nursing homes, assisted living facilities, 
and home care.68  When the last penny of government funding was spent, 
these asserted alternatives were underutilized and many of the mentally ill 
ended up on the streets where they self-medicated their illnesses.69  The 
War on Drugs started soon thereafter, in the 1970s.70  The culmination of 
these two trends led to a jump in the percentage of inmates with serious 
mental illness as well as a large decrease in the number of individuals 
hospitalized for serious mental illness.71 
The positive correlation between mental health issues and addiction is 
embodied in the concept of “dual diagnosis,” a situation where a person has 
both a mood disorder and an addiction problem; thus, the War on Drugs’s 
high incarceration periods for drug convictions disproportionately impacted 
those individuals living with mental health issues.72  The National Alliance 
on Mental Illness estimates that “[a]bout a third of all people experiencing 
mental illnesses and about half of people living with severe mental illnesses 
also experience substance abuse.”73 
Prior to 1984, judges had almost unlimited discretion when it came to 
sentencing.74  One commentator noted that the system was one that had “the 
absence of rational ordering,” with various sentences applied “arbitrar[ily] 
and discriminator[ily].”75  Accordingly, in 1984, Congress attempted to 
stem judges’ broad sentencing discretion by replacing it with a more 
uniform application of prescribed sentences.76  As part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Congress passed the Sentencing 
Reform Act.77  That statute, in turn, established the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (“the Sentencing Commission” or “the Commission”), an 
agency of the judicial branch that became responsible for developing 
uniform guidelines for sentencing.78  The Sentencing Commission kept 
 
 67. See Terry A. Kupers, A Community Mental Health Model in Corrections, 26 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 123 (2015) (noting that the War on Drugs “captured many individuals 
with serious mental illness in its dragnet”). 
 68. Anisha Lewis, Incarceration and Mental Health, CTR. PRISONER HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS., http://www.prisonerhealth.org/educational-resources/factsheets-2/incarceration-and-
mental-health/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4P72-7HQD]. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Dual Diagnosis, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/Learn-
More/Mental-Health-Conditions/Related-Conditions/Dual-Diagnosis (last visited Oct. 16, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/3KLM-CCKN]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1973). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Wanda A. Luettgen, Topical Survey, Criminal Law—Right to Collaterally Challenge 
Prior Convictions Not Guaranteed by Sentencing Guidelines—United States v. Issacs, 143 
F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1994), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 892, 893–94 (1994). 
 77. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). 
 78. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–70 (1989) (discussing the 
background, purpose, and operation of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Commission). 
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some of the more traditional goals in mind when developing guidelines:  
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.79  At the same 
time, the Commission also focused on “minimizing disparity in sentencing, 
and accounting for ‘advancement in the knowledge of human behavior as it 
relates to the criminal justice system.’”80  Thus, the Commission 
promulgated the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“the Sentencing Guidelines” 
or “the Guidelines”), which sought to correct the discriminatory application 
of sentences and provide for more predictable sentences.81  These 
mandatory Guidelines were promulgated in 1987, ending an era in which a 
trial judge’s prescribed sentence was “virtually unquestioned.”82  It was not 
until 2005 that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which Congress had made mandatory for judges to follow, were 
unconstitutional.83  The Court held that requiring judges to sentence within 
a set time period violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.84  As a 
result, the Guidelines became “effectively advisory.”85  This brought a sea 
of change to the federal appellate courts.  Some took the “Booker 
maximalism” stance, the view that “the Guidelines no longer had a 
privileged place in sentencing.”86  Others applied a “Booker minimalism” 
approach, which gave the Guidelines more weight than other factors, 
arguing that “they had a special role in promoting sentencing uniformity,” 
and they “accounted for the other § 3553(a) factors.”87 
The effects of the Sentencing Guidelines—both when they were 
mandatory and now that they are advisory—and the War on Drugs are not 
all positive and their combined effect on society, some argue, has been 
grave.88  Large differences in the length of sentences still exist on the basis 
of race, gender, education, income, and citizenship, despite the Guidelines’ 
command that these characteristics not affect the sentence length.89  For 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/85V7-VTB5]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing:  Too Little Law, Too 
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695–96 (2010). 
 83. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005); see also Francis X. Shen, 
The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography:  Navigating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 358 (2010). See generally Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan:  The 
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(2005). 
 84. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
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Review, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 835, 837 (2007). 
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 88. See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last?:  Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities 
in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 76 (2015) (“While the guidelines reduced inter 
judge sentencing disparities in their early years, . . . many criticized them for being 
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 89. David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:  Evidence 
from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 311 (2001). 
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example, racial disparities in sentencing continue to exist, and some studies 
suggest that they have actually increased since Booker.90  African 
Americans account for approximately 12 percent of the population of the 
United States, but almost 40 percent of those incarcerated are African 
American.91  There are more African American men in prison today than 
there were African Americans slaves in 1850.92  Lower-income offenders 
are less likely to receive downward departures and more likely to receive 
upward departures.93  Evidence suggests that even when judges have 
awarded departures from the recommended sentences to lower-earning 
offenders, these departures are typically only small reductions in 
sentencing.94  Because the Guidelines allow judges to reduce or increase the 
recommended sentence, over half of the unaccounted for differences in 
sentences are generated by departures from the Guidelines, rather than from 
sentencing within the Guidelines.95  While the Guidelines are certainly 
Congress’s attempt to combat these disparities, they clearly still exist, and 
there is at least the suggestion that implicit bias in sentencing and 
prosecution play a role in maintaining that disparity today.96 
Legal commentators suggested that the Guidelines had a similar effect on 
the mentally ill.97  The Guidelines provided for a downward departure from 
the calculated sentencing Guidelines range for individuals with a mental 
illness.98  In considering whether to apply this downward departure, the 
Guidelines instruct judges to consider “if such [mental and emotional] 
conditions, individually or in combination with other offender 
characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case 
from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”99  The Guidelines are 
careful to focus on mental and emotional conditions, which were previously 
deemed irrelevant to determining whether a downward departure was 
warranted in a particular situation.100  In addition to those considerations, 
 
 90. Yang, supra note 88, at 77 (“I find that Booker significantly increased racial 
disparities after controlling for extensive offender and crime characteristics.”). 
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690 (2014). 
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 93. See Mustard, supra note 89, at 312. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Clemons, supra note 91, at 696. 
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the Guidelines account for diminished capacity in section 5K2.13,101 which 
also allows for downward departures from the recommended Guidelines 
sentencing range.102 
Despite these lofty goals and far-reaching considerations for mental 
health, pundits suggest that these outcomes have not been realized.  Instead 
of providing for further consideration of mental illness, legal commentators 
have observed, “Booker’s main effect may have been to create a second 
pathway for judges to impose above-Guidelines sentences.”103  Some say 
this reaction can be traced back to one of the main impetuses for 
establishing the Guidelines:  John Hinckley’s acquittal and the subsequent 
public distaste for the insanity defense.104  The War on Drugs also may 
have played a role here, as “the Guidelines were crafted to ensure that drug 
dependence, which is perhaps most reasonably viewed as mental illness, 
would not act to mitigate sentences.”105 
Even though there may be issues with the Sentencing Guidelines, they 
are the current method by which the judiciary bases sentencing decisions.  
Utilizing neuroscience in this space requires consideration and knowledge 
of the Guidelines’ advantages as well as their disadvantages. 
C.  Current Utilization of Neuroscience 
in the Criminal Justice System 
Lawyers recently have begun utilizing neuroscience in the courtroom, 
and, almost more notably, courts have embraced it.  For instance, in 2005, 
the Supreme Court considered neuroscientific theories of child development 
to support its reasoning in prohibiting the death penalty for older 
juveniles.106  More recently, in a 2011 case, Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n,107 Justice Breyer wrote a dissent that relied heavily on 
neuroscience research demonstrating a correlation between virtual violence 
in video games and aggressive tendencies of those children who played 
them.108  While “law and neuroscience” is useful as a general descriptive 
phrase, it is too vague to be applicable in particular research and applied 
contexts.  In practice, it is particular aspects of law that may be affected by 
particular types of neuroscience research.109 
 
 101. See id. § 5K2.13. 
 102. See id. 
 103. The Law of Mental Illness, supra note 97, at 1138. 
 104. Id. at 1135. 
 105. Id. at 1136. 
 106. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 107. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 108. Id. at 850–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109. Shen, supra note 83, at 4. 
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1.  At Trial 
Neuroscience has slowly crept into the trial phase of court cases, in both 
the criminal and civil dockets.110  In the criminal docket, it has been 
introduced in all three phases of trial:  preliminary determinations of 
competency, the guilt phase, and the sentencing phase.111  Most notably, 
neuroscience has been utilized to negate an ability to form the mens rea 
necessary for premeditation and deliberation and to bolster a defense for not 
guilty by reason of insanity.112  Even though these types of cases are few 
and far between, and the science is still in its infancy, they demonstrate the 
roles that neuroscience could one day play on a grander scale. 
In the civil docket, neuroscience has proved itself to be equally 
beneficial.  For example, in P.P. v. Compton Unified School District,113 the 
plaintiffs, students in the Compton Unified School District in Los Angeles, 
California, utilized neuroscience to bolster their complaint.114  The district 
court relied on the scientific evidence to deny a motion dismiss for failure 
to state a claim.115  The students’ claim was that their exposure to childhood 
trauma116 and their likely diagnosis of complex trauma “impair[ed] their 
ability to perform activities essential to education—including, but not 
limited to, learning, thinking, reading, and concentrating,” resulting in a 
violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).117  All 
sorts of claims have utilized neuroscience in the civil arena:  personal 
injury, medical malpractice, and toxic exposure cases, to name a few.118  In 
short, neuroscience’s applications are widespread, and lawyers should 
consider whether it could play a crucial role in litigation. 
2.  At Sentencing 
Neuroscience can also play a unique role in sentencing, although the 
scope of that role is still somewhat vague.  There is, of course, the issue of 
admissibility, which is currently being debated in state courts.  Like other 
experts presented during sentencing, either Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or 
the associated state rule usually applies to expert testimony provided by 
neuropsychologists regarding diagnosis and causation.119  While most states 
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accept neuropsychological testimony from experts, a minority of states—
such as Florida, Georgia, and Virginia—prohibit it, instead concluding that 
only medical experts, such as physicians, are qualified to testify on 
diagnosis, causation, and prognosis.120 
At the federal level, the Sixth Circuit has weighed in on the debate.  In 
Fautenberry v. Mitchell,121 the dissenting opinion stated that a 
neuropsychological examination is “the most effective means possible of 
determining whether [the defendant] had a brain impairment” stemming 
from her unstable family environment, emotionally abusive upbringing, and 
undocumented physical abuse.122  Although the defendant declined to 
submit to any neurological exams in that particular case, the dissent went on 
to acknowledge that a neuropsychologist could presumably have 
discovered, verified, and revealed such brain damage.123  Further, the 
dissenting opinion argued that this evidence could have been admitted to 
aid the defendant’s case as mitigating evidence during the sentencing stage 
of trial.124 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, neuroscience is mostly utilized in very serious 
cases, generally where the defendant is facing a death sentence, life 
imprisonment, or a substantially long term of imprisonment.125  Specifically 
with respect to the death penalty, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
opportunity to consider offenders’ past life experiences and other 
evidence.126  It has concluded the following: 
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in 
all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, 
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.127 
The Court described these types of considerations in death penalty cases 
“far more important than in noncapital cases.”128 
Jurisprudence and legal commentators have noted that considering 
mitigating circumstances is critical because they suggest that the defendant 
is not fully culpable for the crime charged, and therefore, the defendant is 
worthy of a lower sentence than the average person who has no 
neurological issues.129  A prime example of this logic is reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s 2002 case Atkins v. Virginia.130  There, the Court held that 
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execution of anyone who suffers from mental retardation is barred under the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.131 
While neuroscience may offer some answers regarding mitigating 
circumstances, it is imperative that lawyers utilizing this technology 
understand how to effectively communicate its findings.  For instance, 
successfully presenting an Atkins claim is exceptionally complex.132  Not 
only does “[i]t require[] tremendous preparation involving many hours of 
consultation with . . . expert forensic psychologists, neuropsychologists, 
and/or psychiatrists,” it also requires an attorney’s understanding of these 
concepts and ability to synthesize these issues for presentment to the court 
and the jury.133  The same concerns are true where neuroscience is used to 
offer evidence of mitigating circumstances. 
While such a concern addresses how neuroscience is used, there have 
also been concerns about who uses neuroscience.  Some legal theorists have 
voiced concern over the possibility of neuroscience being a negative 
influence in court.134  Designating neuroscience as a “double-edged sword,” 
these commentators have suggested that it “will either get defendants off 
the hook altogether or unfairly brand them as posing a future danger to 
society.”135  As one commentator put it, “[a] major concern is that 
prosecutors will seek the death penalty based on neuroscience evidence 
indicating that a defendant is likely to commit future crimes.”136  But in the 
end, neuroscience has thus far been used only to “provide fact-finders with 
more complete, reliable, and precise information when determining a 
defendant’s fate.”137 
Lastly, there have been articulated concerns about what neuroscience can 
show regarding the ingrained tendencies of individuals.138  Neuroscience 
demonstrates that certain brain regions may serve multiple cognitive 
functions and, vice versa, some cognitive functions may activate different 
areas of the brain.  This knowledge allows neuroscientists to surmise what 
is going on with the brain and how those cognitive functions affect 
behavior, all by examining neuroimaging data.  Still, just as in any young 
scientific field, this information is not completely reliable, and it may go so 
far as to expose information that we were not looking for.139  Two 
specialists in the field, Martha J. Farah and Paul Root Wolpe, stated that 
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“[a]lthough brainwaves do not lie, neither do they tell the truth.”140  In other 
words, the fear is that neuroscience could someday “unfairly brand”141 an 
individual as dangerous.  However, our society’s criminal justice system 
does not punish actions a person may take; it only punishes those that an 
individual has taken. 
Even though there may be gaps in our knowledge of how the brain 
works, the future holds possibility, and the more we learn about the brain 
and how it operates, the more the legal field can adapt to and embrace these 
scientific advancements regarding mitigating circumstances.  As for now, 
commentators and courts have accepted that neuroscience offers a window 
into the mindset of the individual standing before the court, and the greater 
a court’s understanding of the individual, the greater the court’s ability to 
assess and apply an appropriate sentence.  This cumulates in greater justice 
to society and, ultimately, the individual themselves. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The extensive development of neuroscience and the proliferation of 
analysis regarding how we do and should use it in a courtroom has captured 
the legal community’s attention.142  At this point, the question is not 
whether we should utilize the advancements in technology and insight into 
defendants that neuroscience offers, the question is when and how.143  
However, there is one area of law that has not been thoroughly discussed 
and could directly benefit from the addition of neuroscience and 
neuropsychology:  sentencing for non-death-penalty-eligible defendants. 
To do so, neuroimaging experts contribute to “defendants’ claims that, 
although legally guilty, they do not deserve to die because the abnormal 
structure and/or function of their brains diminishes their culpability.”144  As 
previously discussed, since the 1800s, the criminal justice system has 
generally embarked on a journey away from mandatory sentences and 
toward one of discretionary application of sentencing factors, especially in 
the context of the death penalty.145  Today, public policy is to apply 
discretionary sentencing based on an individual’s background and 
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circumstances, a stance recognized by both Congress and the judiciary.146  
Judges are encouraged to “consider any relevant mitigating evidence 
regarding the defendant’s character or background, and the circumstances 
of the particular offense.”147  Neuroscience can speak to all of these 
considerations. 
A.  Neuroscience as a Mitigating Factor at Sentencing 
Based on neurological evidence, cognitive neuroscientists are now 
seeking “to assist defendants’ mitigation claims by invoking cutting-edge 
brain imaging research on the neurobiological roots of criminal violence” 
within offenders’ brains.148  Because neuroscience expands upon how and 
why a person may act or think the way she does, it can offer insight into a 
defendant’s true culpability.149  Whether true culpability should be at the 
core of sentencing considerations was perhaps best analyzed by Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor.  In her concurrence in California v. Brown,150 
Justice O’Connor stated, “In my view, evidence about the defendant’s 
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this 
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be 
less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”151  She questioned 
whether our criminal justice system should focus more on the individual or 
focus more on righting a wrong committed against society, asserting that 
the Supreme Court has been responsive to developing a method for 
reviewing and applying capital punishment that is “sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual.”152  Although the case she discussed related to 
capital punishment, she suggested that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Lockett v. Ohio153 and Eddings v. Oklahoma154 “reflect the belief that 
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the 
criminal defendant.”155  Justice O’Connor concluded that “the sentence 
imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the 
defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or 
 
 146. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (“We recognize that, in 
noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on 
constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes.  The considerations that 
account for the wide acceptance of individualization of sentences in noncapital cases surely 
cannot be thought less important in capital cases.”). 
 147. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 148. Snead, supra note 35, at 1269. 
 149. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 12, at 49 (“Neuropsychological testing plays an important 
role in explaining to a jury the existence and extent of the plaintiff’s problems with work and 
other daily activities.”). 
 150. 479 U.S. 538 (1987). 
 151. Id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 152. Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)). 
 153. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 154. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 155. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
498 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
emotion.”156  The Supreme Court has since quoted Justice O’Connor’s 
sentiments with approval.157 
Those sentiments are precisely what lawyers are using to ask courts to 
consider neuroscience as a mitigating factor at sentencing.  Legal minds 
have argued the following: 
[N]eurolaw’s promise to reveal why people think and behave as they do is 
inescapably built on the idea that people are not agents as the law 
traditionally views them.  Instead, they are guided almost entirely by 
determined and unconscious chemical cascades which exert irresistible 
control over an agent’s thinking and behavior.158 
Still, the Supreme Court has indicated that while neuroscientific evidence 
“does not negate” the “responsibility for committing the underlying offense, 
it does bear upon an argument” that a mental illness or problem may impair 
the “ability to conform . . . conduct to the requirements of the law.”159  
Thus, one strategy that defense attorneys may choose to utilize is to 
affirmatively demonstrate through neuroscience that, while an individual 
may be guilty, she should be held less culpable for her actions than other 
members of our society would.160  Indeed, the Court has long recognized 
that individualized sentencing is appropriate, even though it is not 
constitutionally required.161  Moreover, a judge’s expansive discretion at 
sentencing affords her the leeway necessary to consider vast amounts of 
information,162 including information about a defendant’s background and 
life choices.163 
Neuroscience can provide a qualified assessment of how culpable society 
may want to hold a particular person, given their background and its effect 
on their abilities to process situations in accordance with societal norms.164  
Although the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is to ensure more uniform 
sentences, neuroscientific evidence fits into the mold created by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Even if a judge chooses not to depart from the 
Guidelines range for a given defendant, she may consider the weight of the 
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evidence in applying a sentence from the low or the high end of a given 
Guidelines sentencing range.  In short, the ability of neuroscience to 
explicitly identify and explain how one’s background affects culpability is 
supplemental information a judge may find useful at sentencing in 
attempting to distribute justice. 
B.  Combating Implicit Bias with Neuroscience 
Neuroscience can also be used to combat any implicit bias that may be 
present at sentencing.  Implicit bias, or social cognition, is the process by 
which the brain uses “mental associations that are so well-established as to 
operate without awareness, or without intention, or without control.”165  
There has been an explosion of research over the past decade about implicit 
bias and its relationship to decisions and actions.  This research offers new 
avenues and opportunities to intervene and reduce the effects of bias in 
institutions and interactions.  Evidence from hundreds of thousands of 
individuals shows the following: 
(1) [T]he magnitude of implicit bias toward members of outgroups or 
disadvantaged groups is large, (2) implicit bias often conflicts with 
conscious attitudes, endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior, (3) 
implicit bias influences evaluations of and behavior toward those who are 
the subject of the bias, and (4) self, situational, or broader cultural 
interventions can correct systematic and consensually shared implicit 
bias.166 
There are three important aspects regarding implicit biases that are 
crucial to remember.  First, we all have biases; they are a way for us to 
process and organize the vast amounts of information that we observe every 
day.167  Second, unconscious biases often conflict with society’s egalitarian 
values.168  Third, implicit biases often predict and determine actions and 
decisions more so than the values that we make sure to explicitly adopt.169  
Thus, implicit biases are always present, including at sentencing. 
Researchers have analyzed the effect of a trial court judge’s implicit 
biases on defendants in the judge’s courtroom.  One study found that, 
according to the Implicit Association Test, consistent with other Americans, 
judges held implicit associations concerning African Americans.170  
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However, these associations were only influential when the race of the 
defendant was manipulated through subliminal techniques.171  When the 
race of the defendant was explicitly identified, implicit associations had no 
influence on judgment.172  These results suggest that judges are able to 
control the influence of unconscious racial bias but only when they are 
focused on doing so.173 
Because implicit biases play a role in the courtroom and at sentencing, 
the question then becomes what should we do about it?  Neuroscience 
offers insight into practical ways to reduce bias by offering mitigating 
evidence that may help the sentencing judge identify these biases.  When a 
neurological test can demonstrate that a defendant’s thought process does 
not operate as one a judge would normally encounter—whether that is due 
to diminished culpability or a brain injury—a judge could consider that 
information, counteracting any implicit biases she may be holding about the 
defendant’s obvious characteristics.174  After all, reliance on physical 
evidence that can be brought forth to affirmatively show that someone 
thinks differently is immensely more convincing than the mere 
acknowledgment that an individual experienced childhood trauma or had a 
brain injury.175 
Neuroscience also contributes to one of the main ways to combat implicit 
biases:  individuation.176  Individuation requires the person attempting to 
combat her implicit biases to gather specific information about an 
individual before her.177  Thus, instead of making judgments on the basis of 
the defendant’s group characteristics, a judge armed with neurological 
information and data can make judgments based on the defendant’s 
personal characteristics.178  In other words, the judge would be able to 
explicitly recognize that a group characteristic that may result in a bias is 
merely one of that individual’s many, many attributes.179 
Individuation walks hand in hand with another common way to combat 
implicit bias:  “perspective-taking.”  Perspective-taking constitutes 
“imagining oneself in the shoes of someone from a different social or ethnic 
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group.”180  When individuals take part in perspective-taking viewpoints, 
studies show that it “weakens the automatic expression of racial biases.”181  
In fact, various “perspective-taking activities substantially decrease[] 
implicit bias as measured by the IAT and behavioral changes.”182  
Neuroscience, and especially its subfield of study, neuropsychology, with 
its in-depth reviews of a person’s background and past experiences, can 
help a judge engage in perspective-taking.  Further, it exposes judges to a 
defendant’s background, as discussed by a relevant expert, as opposed to 
the defendant herself or the defendant’s attorney.  Establishing a connection 
with the defendant’s background and attempting to further understand it 
“may help a judge take, rather than evade, responsibility for the 
consequences of her decisions.”183 
There is no shortage of ways that neuroscience can facilitate the 
sentencing process.  As the science continues to develop, criminal justice 
system actors should continue to look for ways in which it can provide even 
more insight and clarity into a defendant’s life, providing a fuller picture for 
sentencing purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the seventeenth century, the criminal justice system has concerned 
itself with mental states of the accused.184  Even though the concept of 
neuroscience has only been around since the 1960s,185 recent expansions 
and developments in the field have opened a window, shedding light on the 
vast darkness that encompasses what little we know about the brain.  It 
indicates that an offender’s criminal intent or mental state may be the 
product of her past experiences, especially those during childhood.  Using 
this vital information during the sentencing phase of a convicted offender 
could more thoroughly help a judge apply an appropriate sentence and 
avoid biases, thereby providing more principled justice. 
Courts have the tools necessary to handle the newest forms of 
technology, even those in their infancy.186  It will be up to the lawyers 
appearing before the court to learn and utilize the many offerings of 
neuroscience in both criminal and civil trials and at sentencing hearings as a 
form of mitigating evidence.  It will be up to judges to contemplate the 
information offered to them and employ and utilize it appropriately, both in 
sentencing and to counteract their own implicit biases.  And it will be up to 
state and federal legislators to take advantage of the information and data 
discovered by these studies and form more thoughtful and responsive 
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policies and statutes that address the systemic problems leading to mass 
incarceration. 
Defendants exposed to childhood trauma are one of the most prominent 
examples of those who can benefit from utilizing neuroscientific evidence 
in a courtroom.  Individualized assessments of a defendant’s background 
can expand on why she may have behaved a particular way, such as if it 
was the result of repeated exposure to traumatic situations during 
childhood.  This particularly applies to, for example, those who grow up in 
dangerous inner-city neighborhoods and those who end up in the foster care 
and welfare systems.  Not only does neuroscience offer judges insight into 
individuals such as these, but it can also facilitate judges’ attempts to 
counteract implicit biases. 
In sum, participants in the criminal justice system—from judges and 
defense attorneys to prosecutors and legislators—should keep abreast of the 
developments in neuroscience and consider whether the use of neuroscience 
and neuropsychology would be beneficial given the particular 
circumstances of the case, either in dealing with a particular individual or a 
societal issue.  As the technology continues to flourish, we should embrace 
it in our communal efforts to continue bending the arc of the moral universe 
toward justice.187 
 
 187. See THEODORE PARKER, TEN SERMONS OF RELIGION 84–85 (1853). 
